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The effect of lenders’ credit risk transfer activities on 
borrowing firms’ equity returns 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 31/2006 
Ian W Marsh 




Although innovative credit risk transfer techniques help to allocate risk more 
optimally, policymakers worry that they may detrimentally affect the effort spent 
by financial intermediaries in screening and monitoring credit exposures. This 
paper examines the equity market’s response to loan announcements. In common 
with the literature it reports a significantly positive average excess return – the 
well known ‘bank certification’ effect. However, if the lending bank is known to 
actively manage its credit risk exposure through large-scale securitization 
programmes, the magnitude of the effect falls by two thirds. The equity market 
does not appear to place any value on news of loans extended by banks that are 
known to transfer credit risk off their books. 
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Pankkien luottojohdannaisten käytön vaikutus 
asiakasyritysten osaketuottoihin 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 31/2006 
Ian W. Marsh 




Uudet luottoriskien siirtoon tarkoitetut instrumentit helpottavat riskien optimaalis-
ta kohdentumista. Rahoitusviranomaiset kantavat kuitenkin huolta siitä, että nämä 
instrumentit voivat samalla heikentää rahoituksenvälittäjien  panostusta luotto-
asiakkaiden seulontaan ja seurantaan. Tässä työssä tutkitaan osakemarkkinoiden 
reaktioita luottopäätöksistä annettaviin ilmoituksiin. Aikaisempien tutkimusten 
mukaisesti tulokseksi saadaan, että asiakasyrityksen osaketuotto, joka on ensin 
suhteutettu markkinatuottoon, on positiivinen ilmoituksen yhteydessä. Tämä tulos 
tunnetaan ns. sertifiointivaikutuksena. Vaikutus pienenee kuitenkin kolmasosaan, 
jos pankin tiedetään hallitsevan luottoriskejään laajojen arvopaperistamisohjel-
mien avulla. Näin ollen osakemarkkinat eivät näytä juuri arvostavan luottopäätök-
siä, joita tekevät pankit siirtävät luottoriskin kokonaan pois taseestaan. 
 
Avainsanat: pankkiluotot, luottojohdannaiset, luottopäätöksen ns. sertifiointi-
vaikutus 
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  ‘Credit derivatives encourage banks to lend more than they otherwise would, 
at lower rates, to riskier borrowers. Banks with credit derivatives lack 
incentive to keep a close watch on borrowers… Because credit derivatives 
leave borrowers unmonitored, they fuel the credit expansion. And, as Charles 
Kindleberger, the late financial historian, noted, unmonitored expansion of 
credit precipitates the manias that lead to market panics and crashes.’ 
  Frank Partnoy and David Skeel, Financial Times 17 July 2006. 
 
  ‘banks have every incentive to follow client performance closely even when 
they have hedged a loan…If a bank were to gain a reputation for being a poor 
underwriter, its access to liquidity would be quickly withdrawn by the 
market.’ 
  Stuart Lewis, Financial Times 26 July 2006. 
 
Recent innovations in credit derivatives markets have improved lenders’ abilities 
to transfer credit risk to other institutions while maintaining relationships with 
borrowers. Single name products such as credit default swaps (CDS) allow 
lenders to insure themselves against default loss, although such products are only 
traded for a relatively small number of large high-profile borrowers with low 
information asymmetry. However, banks can securitize portfolio credit risk 
through collateralized loan obligations (CLO) allowing them to sell credit risk 
originating from smaller, relationship borrowers where information asymmetries 
may have hitherto prevented risk transfer. 
  Such innovations have generally received a guarded welcome from regulators 
and policy-makers who recognize the benefits of allowing credit risk to reside in 
institutions separate from the loan originators. Diversification benefits are widely 
thought, although rarely demonstrated, to be large. Even the authors of the first 
quotation above note that ‘if banks that lent money to companies such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Swissair and Railtrack had not used credit derivatives, some surely 
would have failed in the wave of defaults that followed.’ Similarly, Alan 
Greenspan, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated that ‘the development of 
credit derivatives has contributed to the stability of the banking system by 
allowing banks, especially the largest systemically important banks, to measure 
and manage their credit risks more effectively.’
1 
  The welcome has been guarded at least in part because policy-makers are 
concerned that credit derivatives may raise moral hazard issues. As Kiff, Michaud 
and Mitchell (2002) note, moral hazard issues arise in two dimensions. 
                                                 
1 Speech given to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-First Annual Conference on Bank 
Structure, 5 May 2005.  
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  First, lender moral hazard may occur when the lender purchases credit 
protection against the wishes of the borrower or without informing the borrower. 
The purchase of credit protection may send a negative signal about the quality of 
the borrower (Dahiya, Puri and Saunders, 2001). 
  Second, borrower moral hazard may result. In the absence of credit risk 
transfer markets, lenders will monitor borrowers and force them to choose and 
continue to run first-best projects. This ‘bank certification’ signals the borrower’s 
quality to the market, allowing the borrower to combine more costly loan finance 
with cheaper bond finance. If the borrower’s equity is traded, the signal should 
also increase the stock price (James, 1987). However, when credit risk transfer 
instruments exist, reduced bank monitoring by insured lenders will reduce the 
value of bank certification. The equilibrium outcome may be that borrowers no 
longer pay a premium for bank loan certification and run first-best projects, but 
instead issue bonds and run second-best projects (Morrison, 2005). Total welfare 
may be reduced even though the ability of lenders to hedge credit risk might have 
been thought to improve welfare. Parlour and Plantin (2005) and Behr and Lee 
(2005) also derive negative implications for credit risk transfer innovations on 
monitoring incentives. 
 Conversely,  Arping  (2004)  and Chiesa (2006) argue that credit risk transfer 
can enhance monitoring incentives. Arping (2004) shows that credit risk transfer 
activities can enhance monitoring by making banks act tougher. Chiesa (2006) 
argues that portfolio credit risk transfer reduces a bank’s exposure to the common 
factor in credit risk but it retains idiosyncratic risks. It is rewarded for monitoring 
these risks and, since the common credit risk is removed, it now costs less capital 
for banks to engage in monitoring. For fixed capital, monitored lending now 
increases following credit risk transfer, consistent with the empirical evidence of 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) and Goderis et al (2006), and the quote from 
Partnoy and Skeel above. 
  This paper examines the degree to which a borrower receives bank 
certification in a world where credit risk transfer instruments are available. 
Following the established literature on the equity price effects of loan 
announcements we test whether the known activities of the lender in credit risk 
transfer markets affect the market’s response to a new loan. In common with most 
of the literature, we find a significant positive equity market response to new loan 
announcements. The size of the response is shown to depend on both lender and 
borrower characteristics already highlighted by the literature. The main 
contribution of the paper comes from showing that obtaining a loan from a bank 
that has historically transferred credit risk through loan securitization (CLO 
issuance) produces no significant equity market response. Raising a loan from an 
otherwise equivalent bank that has not issued a CLO is associated with a rise in 
the borrower’s equity price.  
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  The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the evidence 
on loan announcement returns. Section 3 discusses the different credit risk transfer 
activities available to lenders. We describe the data and econometric approach in 
Section 4, and present the results in Section 5. The article concludes with a 
summary and interpretation of the key findings. 
 
 
2  Prior evidence on loan announcements 
James (1987) is the first paper to focus on the announcement effects of bank 
loans. For a sample of 80 bank loan announcements he finds an average borrower 
abnormal return of 1.93 per cent, significant at the one percent level. By contrast, 
public debt announcements do not elicit a positive stock market response. 
Subsequent research has refined James’ basic conclusion that bank loans are 
special in that they convey a positive signal to the market (the bank certification 
effect). 
  One refinement is that the nature of the loan contract may matter. Lummer 
and McConnell (1989), and Best and Zhang (1993) distinguish loan renewals 
from new bank loans. They find that new loans on average generate no abnormal 
returns and that only renewals are associated with a certification effect. However 
Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) find no difference between the two.
2 
  Other papers focus on borrower characteristics. The size of the borrower 
(Slovin, Johnson and Glascock, 1992), the risk of the borrower (Best and Zhang, 
1993), and prior stock price performance of the borrower (James and Smith, 2000) 
each appear related to the size of the abnormal returns. Smaller firms garner 
higher abnormal returns, with borrower size possibly being inversely related to the 
informational advantage of banks as lenders. Best and Zhang (1993) find that 
borrowers with recent negative trends in earnings or greater dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings expectations receive larger abnormal returns, and James and 
Smith (2000) conjecture that loan announcements are valued most when the 
borrower’s stock has underperformed and the use of equity finance is limited. All 
of these are consistent with the market valuing the loan announcement in the 
context of what is already publicly known about the borrower. 
  A third set of papers concentrates on the lenders’ characteristics. While the 
initial work of James (1987) suggested that only bank loans generate abnormal 
announcement returns, Preece and Mullineaux (1994) and Billett, Flannery, and 
Garfinkel (1994) demonstrate that loans from non-banks are also valued by the 
equity market. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) also show that lenders with 
                                                 
2 The result appears to hinge on the definition of what constitutes a new loan. See Billett, Flannery, 
and Garfinkel (1995) for details. In this paper we struggle to identify sufficient unambiguous new 
or renewal loans to confidently analyse differences between the two.  
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a higher credit rating are associated with larger abnormal borrower returns. The 
value of the certification depends on the perceived quality of the certifier, be they 
a bank or a non-bank. 
  We extend the literature by considering whether the credit risk transfer policy 
of the bank affects the abnormal return, focussing on the newer credit derivatives-
based technology. Two papers have looked at the more established credit risk 
transfer technology of loan sales. Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2001) verify the 
logical converse of the positive effect of a loan announcement by finding a 
negative impact surrounding the announcement a loan sale by a bank. The validity 
of the negative signal is confirmed in that there is a marked incidence of 
bankruptcy among borrowers whose loans are sold. Closer to our paper, Gande 
and Saunders (2005) ask whether bank loan announcements still convey a positive 
signal when a secondary market already exists for loans to those borrowers. They 
argue two factors could erode the certification value. First, as argued above, it can 
reduce the incentive for the lender to monitor. Second, the secondary market may 
act as an alternative source of information. Nevertheless, Gande and Saunders still 
find an announcement effect. Further, they find a positive stock price response 
when a borrower’s loans start secondary market trading. Together, their findings 
suggest that bank certification remains even when a borrower’s loans are traded, 
and that bank monitoring and secondary market trading are complementary 
sources of information about borrowers. 
  The existence of a secondary loan market can be viewed as a borrower 
characteristic. The existence of a secondary loan market for a borrower does not 
remove the certification effect of a new loan to that borrower. While the existence 
of the established secondary market might reduce the cost of transferring the 
credit risk, it does not imply that the bank will necessarily take advantage of this 
facility. However, what if the bank has a track record of utilising credit risk 
transfer techniques? The hypothesis tested in this paper is that the certification 
effect of a new loan is adversely affected by whether the lender is known to use 
credit risk transfer techniques that could be applied to that loan. In the following 
section we briefly survey the credit risk transfer techniques available to banks. 
 
 
3  Credit risk transfer techniques 
The credit risk exposure of banks used typically to remain on the banks’ books 
until maturity of the loan or default. Screening and monitoring of borrowers were 
the main approaches to bank credit risk management. Two additional tools were  
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available, purchasing credit insurance and loan sales.
3 Both suffered from the 
lemons problem since the insurer/purchaser was typically at an informational 
disadvantage to the bank. However, through time, the secondary market for 
syndicated loans has grown, since all syndicate members have, in theory, access 
to broadly similar information about the borrower. 
  Credit default swaps, and variants on the theme, offer a new way of hedging 
credit risk. Instead of shifting the loan off the balance sheet through a loan sale, 
the bank can buy credit protection from a third party. The credit exposure remains 
on the banks’ books but the credit risk has been sold. As such, CDS contracts 
resemble credit insurance. The key differences are that CDS contracts are 
tradeable, and unlike insurance contracts, credit protection can be bought even if 
the buyer has no credit exposure. The CDS market is growing but the lemons 
problem remains for less well-known companies, and a liquid market only exists 
for credit exposures to companies where informational asymmetries are low. 
  The above approaches are all techniques for managing single-name credit risk 
exposure. Securitization has long been active for portfolios of homogeneous 
commodity exposures such as credit card receivables or mortgages, and loan 
portfolio credit risk transfer techniques have now also evolved. Notably, 
collateralized debt or loan obligations extend the securitization principle to more 
heterogeneous credit exposures. A cash collateralized loan obligation is a form of 
securitization in which assets (bank loans) are removed from a bank’s balance 
sheet and packaged (tranched) into marketable securities that are sold on to 
investors via a special purpose vehicle (SPV). Different tranches of the CLO have 
different risk-return characteristics and can be targeted at specific investor 
classes.
4 De Marzo (2005) shows how pooling and tranching of assets can be used 
to reduce information asymmetries. The retention of some of the first-loss tranche 
by the bank can also help align incentives. A more recent innovation has been the 
development of the synthetic CLO. This does not involve the removal of assets 
from the bank balance sheet. Instead the credit risk associated with the assets is 
transferred into the SPV via either a series of single-name CDS or a single CDS 
referenced to all the credits in the portfolio. 
  Securitization of widely syndicated or rated loans is relatively straightforward 
since the information asymmetry is low. A significant innovation, particularly 
from the perspective of this paper, is the extension into securitizing so-called 
middle market loans which are typically not rated, are either bilateral or only 
narrowly syndicated, and where there can be considerable informational 
                                                 
3 Loan sales may require the consent of the borrower and alternatively loans are sometimes 
assigned in the form of a participation where the original lender remains the only direct lender but 
contracts with a second institution to lay off part of the credit exposure. 
4 The first significant step in the development of the CLO market was the $5bn ROSE Funding #1 
issue by the UK’s National Westminster Bank in September 1996. This CLO was backed by an 
international portfolio of more than 200 commercial loans. One year later, NationsBank (now part 
of Bank of America) launched a $4bn CLO, the first significant deal in the US.  
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advantages for the relationship banks(s). Rating agencies have played a crucial 
role in this. Lenders rely on proprietary risk scoring models to assess the risk of a 
loan, and the agencies have established mappings from internal scores to their 
own ratings. Once the mapping is accepted by investors, the lender can include 
unrated, bilateral loans to relationship clients in the securitisation.
5 
  These relatively recent innovations in single-name and portfolio credit risk 
management tools mean that some previously immobile credit exposures need no 
longer stay on a bank’s books for the life of the loan. As noted above, an 
important question then is whether the lender pays as much attention to the 
borrower as it otherwise would, knowing that the loan will, may or simply could 
be transferred off the bank’s books at some stage. This risk of insufficient 
attention applies both at the screening stage and while monitoring during the life 
of the loan. 
  Bankers such as Mr Lewis, quoted above, clearly believe banks do continue to 
analyse borrowers carefully, and we have noted theoretical work that would 
justify this belief. Others such as Messrs Partnoy and Skeel do not, and they too 
can find support from the theoretical literature. In the analysis that follows, we ask 
the equity market to adjudicate. Specifically, we ask whether the equity price of a 
borrower jumps as much following the announcement of a loan from a bank 
known to use credit risk transfer tools as it would from an otherwise identical 




4.1 Loan  announcements 
We search the Factiva database for press releases containing news of new loans 
by companies traded on the NYSE, Nasdaq or American Stock Exchange during 
the period 1999–2005.
6 Specifically, we first search for press releases containing 
the phrases ‘new credit facility’, ‘new credit agreement’, ‘new bank loan’ or ‘new 
line of credit’. This search yields approximately 4,500 stories. We refine this to 
include only borrowers with identified tickers for one of the three exchanges. This 
reduces the sample to approximately 2,000 stories. We then discard all stories 
with contaminating information such as quarterly reports or takeover 
                                                 
5 Deutsche Bank’s CORE CLO in 1999 included loans to medium-sized German companies. In the 
absence of a CLO-type structure, selling loans made to Mittelstand companies would have been 
difficult because of the strong lending relationships built up by German banks with their corporate 
clients. In the US, Fleet National Bank was among the first commercial bank to securitize middle-
market loans with its issue in 2000. 
6 We begin in 1999 as this is the first year that banks reveal credit derivative positions in 
regulatory filings.  
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announcements, leaving 355 clean announcements. Since we will focus on the 
nature of the credit risk transfer policies of the lender, we further discard all 
announcements where the lender or lead lender(s) in the case of a syndicated loan 
are not identified, leaving 300 stories. Of these, 77 announcements mention a US-
owned bank as lead lender. Non-bank lenders and foreign banks (or US banks 
majority owned by foreign companies) are excluded since their credit risk 
management policies are unclear (see below for further discussion). Finally, we 
find matching stock market data from the CRSP database for each borrower. 
Since we will use the standard event study approach, sufficient uncontaminated 
stock price history prior to the event date is needed. Announcements are dropped 
if stock returns are not available for the 200 trading days prior to the loan 
announcement, or because more than one loan announcement to a company 
occurs within a year (in which case only the first loan is retained). The remaining 
217 clean announcements form the final sample analyzed below. 
 
 
4.2 Loan  characteristics 
For each loan announcement, we record the following information (as available): 
 
•  Amount of loan (in million dollars) [AMT] 
•  Renewal indicator [REN]: The loan is deemed to be a renewal if the press 
release clearly indicates that this is a new or revised loan agreement with a 
lender with whom the firm has a prior loan. 
•  Syndication indicator [SYND]: The loan is deemed to be a syndicated loan if 
it is explicitly called such, or if the press release names the lender as lead 
agent or arranger. 
 
 
4.3 Borrower  characteristics 
We combine the data from the loan announcements with information about the 
borrowers’ stock returns (from CRSP) and a set of variables describing the 
borrowers’ financial condition at the end of the quarter preceding the loan 
announcement (from Compustat). Using these details we construct the following 
borrower characteristics: 
 
•  The standard deviation of the borrower’s stock return residual during the 
estimation period (t-200 through t-51) [SDPE]. Following Best and Zhang 
(1993) shareholders in a firm with higher idiosyncratic risk should value a 
bank’s certification more highly.  
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•  The borrower’s market model beta calculated over the estimation period   
(t-200 through t-51) [BETA]. Shareholders should value a bank’s certification 
more highly for a firm with higher systematic risk. 
•  The cumulative abnormal return on the borrower’s stock during the ten 
trading days preceding the announcement based on the market model 
[RUNUP]. Best and Zhang (1993) find that firms that have recently suffered 
anticipated earnings declines gained more benefit from a loan announcement. 
 
 
4.4 Lender  characteristics 
We combine the data from the loan announcements with information about the 
lender at the end of the quarter preceding the loan announcement (from 
Compustat). Using these details we construct the following lender characteristics: 
 
•  The Standard & Poor’s issuer credit rating [CR_LEND]. Billett, Flannery, and 
Garfinkel (1995) show that lenders with a higher credit rating are associated 
with higher abnormal borrower returns. For use in regressions we convert the 
ordinal rating scale into a numeric one based on the conventional 
correspondence between S&P and Moody’s ratings and the numerical value 
assignments for Moody’s ratings used by Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel 
(1995). Finally we take logs since this appears to fit the data better for our 
sample. 
•  The logarithm of the lender’s total assets [ASSETS_LEND]. Since our sample 
covers several years, in regressions we convert this into real terms 
[ASSETS_LEND_REAL]. 
 
We then construct indicators based on the lender’s known use of the credit risk 
transfer technologies discussed above. 
 
•  Credit default swap protection purchase [CDS_BUY]. From returns of form 
FRY9C (taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago database) we 
observe the total notional outstanding credit derivatives protection purchased 
(line A535) of the reporting bank holding company or any of its connected 
subsidiaries. The indicator takes a value of one if the value is greater than zero 
at the end of the quarter immediately preceding the loan announcement, zero 
otherwise. Where banks were too small to return form FRY9C we checked the 
banks’ annual reports for mention of CDS activities. Banks were deemed not 
to have purchased any protection unless evidence to the contrary could be 
found.  
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•  Credit default swap net protection purchase [CDS_NETBUY]. From the same 
quarterly returns (or accounts) we observe notional credit derivative 
protection purchased less notional protection sold (line A535 – line A534). 
The indicator takes a value of one if the net position is positive in the quarter 
immediately preceding the loan announcement, zero otherwise. 
•  Collateralized loan obligation issuance [CLO]. Using the Asset Backed Alert 
Database, we record the date of issuance of each CLO. The database contains 
information on all rated asset-backed issues, mortgage-backed issues and 
collateralized bond obligations placed anywhere in the world. If the bank 
holding company or any of its connected subsidiaries has issued a CLO before 
the loan announcement date the indicator takes the value of one, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Table 1 provides summary information about the sample of 217 clean loan 
announcements of our primary sample. Panels A, B and C report loan, borrower 
and lender characteristics, respectively. Our sample resembles those used in other 
key studies such as Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995). 
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Table 1.   Sample summary statistics for 217 ‘clean’ loan 
     announcements 
 
Abnormal returns are two-day cumulative abnormal returns for the interval [0,  1] 
computed with market model parameters estimated using daily returns over the period 
[200, -51]. AMT is the value of the loan ($m); REN is an indicator variable taking the 
value one of the loan is a renewal, zero otherwise; SYND is an indicator variable taking 
the value one of the loan is syndicated, zero otherwise; SDPE is the standard deviation of 
the residuals from the market model regression over the estimation window; BETA is the 
estimated coefficient from the market model regression over the estimation window; 
RUNUP is the cumulative abnormal return over the interval [-10, -1]; Credit Rating is the 
Standard and Poor’s debt rating of the lender at the time of the loan announcement; 
ASSETS_BORROW is the total asset value of the borrower ($m); ASSETS_LEND is the 
total asset value of the lender ($m). CDS_BUY is an indicator variable taking the value 
one if the lender reports positive outstanding notional credit derivatives protection 
purchased in the FRY9C return for the quarter immediately prior to the loan 
announcement, zero otherwise; CDS_NETBUY is an indicator variable taking the value 
one if the lender reports net positive outstanding notional credit derivatives protection 
purchase in the FRY9C return for the quarter immediately preceding the loan 
announcement, zero otherwise; CLO is an indicator variable taking the value one if the 
lender (or subsidiary) has issued a collateralized loan obligation prior to the loan 
announcement, zero otherwise. 
 
 Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
Panel A: Loan Characteristics 
Abnormal returns  1.028%  0.236% -17.01%  50.64% 
Loan size (AMT) 122.0  60.0  2.0  1500.0 
Fraction renewals (REN) 5.07%      
Fraction syndicated (SYND) 64.52%       
Panel B: Borrower Characteristics 
SDPE  0.0323 0.0250  0.0075  0.1222 
BETA  1.2055 1.1206  -2.3119  5.2099 
RUNUP  5.49% 2.38%  -72.03%  127.20% 
ASSETS_BORROW  3811.8 966.7  12.93  138042.0 
Panel C: Lender Characteristics 
Credit Rating    A+  BBB-  AA- 
ASSETS_LEND  472058 334250  394  1489981 
Fraction CDS_BUY  88.26%      
Fraction CDS_NETBUY  59.90%      





We use the basic methodology common to this literature. For each clean loan 
announcement, we run a daily market model regression for the borrowing firm 
over the period [-200, -51]. We derive abnormal returns as 
 
( ) mt j j jt jt R ˆ ˆ R AR β + α − =  (5.1) 
 
where Rjt is the rate of return on the stock of firm j on day t, and Rmt is the rate of 
return on CRSP’s dividend-inclusive equally-weighted market index on day t. The 
estimated coefficients of the market model are denoted α ˆ  and β ˆ . Abnormal 
returns are calculated for the period [-11, 1]. 
  Daily abnormal returns are averaged across all firms to produce a daily 










AAR  (5.2) 
 
where N is the number of firms in the sample. Cumulative abnormal returns 















CAR  (5.3) 
 
We use an event window of [0,  1] in the results below. The day after the 
announcement is included as many press releases are relatively late in the trading 
day on day 0. 
 
 
5.1 Univariate  analysis 
Table 2 reports average two-day abnormal returns for the full sample, and for 
various samples based on loan, borrower and lender characteristics. The first line 
in Panel A describes the overall sample of 217 clean loan announcements. The 
average cumulative abnormal return over the event window [0, 1] is +1.028%, 
significant at the five per cent level. The sign and statistical significance of the 
CAR are consistent with the literature. The scale of the impact is higher than 
found in most papers (Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) report a one-day 
average abnormal return of 0.68%, Best and Zhang (1993) report a two-day  
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ACAR of 0.32%, and Lummer and McConnell (1989) report one of 0.61%), 
although the original study by James (1987) reports a two-day ACAR of 1.93%. 
 
Table 2.   Univariate statistics for 217 ‘clean’ loan 
     announcements 
 
CDS_BUY is an indicator variable taking the value one if the lender reports positive 
outstanding notional credit derivatives protection purchased in the FRY9C return for the 
quarter immediately prior to the loan announcement, zero otherwise; CDS_NETBUY is 
an indicator variable taking the value one if the lender reports net positive outstanding 
notional credit derivatives protection purchase in the FRY9C return for the quarter 
immediately preceding the loan announcement, zero otherwise; CLO is an indicator 
variable taking the value one if the lender (or subsidiary) has issued a collateralized loan 
obligation prior to the loan announcement, zero otherwise. Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
per cent level is denoted by *, **, *** respectively. 
 
 Number  of 
Observations 
Mean CAR[0,1]  t-Statistic 
All Loans  217  1.028  2.33
** 
Syndicated Loans  140  0.450  1.01 
Non Syndicated Loans  77  2.079  2.22
** 
Borrower Rated  91  1.269  1.85
* 
Borrower Not Rated  126  0.854  1.48 
Large Borrowers  87  0.000  0.00 
Small Borrowers  88  0.841  1.22 
Lenders Rated A+ or above  134  1.567  2.48
** 
Lenders Rated A or below  83  0.159  0.30 
Large Lenders  107  0.894  1.86
* 
Small Lenders  108  1.098  1.47 
CDS_BUY = 1  188  1.302  2.66
*** 
CDB_BUY = 0  25  -0.666  0.70 
CLO = 1  117  0.591  1.35 




The remaining two lines of Panel A separate syndicated loans from non-
syndicated loans.
7 Consistent with Preece and Mullineaux (1996) we find that 
announcements of non-syndicated loans have significant positive CARs, but that 
announcements of syndicated loans has no impact on stock prices on average. 
  Panel B of Table 2 splits the sample according to borrower characteristics. 
Borrowers rated by Standard and Poor’s at the time of the loan announcement 
appear to have slightly higher (and more significant) mean abnormal returns than 
unrated borrowers, although this difference is not statistically significant. 
Borrower size also appears to have a relatively weak affect on the announcement 
returns. Loan announcements for large borrowers are associated with zero 
                                                 
7 Since we could clearly identify very few loan renewals we do not separate renewals from new 
loans.  
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abnormal returns while smaller borrowers earn positive, although not statistically 
significant, returns.
8 
  Panel C of Table 2 splits the sample according to lender characteristics. 
Unlike Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995), our sample does not contain a wide 
range of lender credit ratings. All lenders were rated between AA- and BBB- at 
the time of loan announcements. Nevertheless, splitting the sample of lenders at 
the median rating shows that higher rated lenders (rated A, or better) are 
associated with significantly positive CARs. Loans from lower rated lenders do 
not generate significant abnormal returns. 
  The size of the lender also appears to matter. Loans from lenders with real 
assets greater than the median value are associated with significant positive CARs 
while CARs from smaller banks are not significant. The size of the lender’s 
balance sheet may be reflecting the ‘quality’ of the lender, in much the same way 
as the lender credit rating matters. 
  The final lines in Panel C focus on the credit risk transfer tools used by the 
lenders. Loans from lenders that have outstanding risk protection at the time of the 
announcement are associated with statistically positive CARs, unlike those from 
lenders with no reported single-name credit risk protection. At first glance, this 
result appears counter-intuitive. On the one hand, CDS protection positions should 
not be relevant for our sample of borrowers as they are not names actively traded 
in this market. Further, if positions in the CDS market are reflecting wider credit 
risk transfer activities then the effect should, according to our hypothesis, be 
negative. One problem is that, as Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2005) 
demonstrate, CDS usage is positively correlated with the size of the bank (which, 
as we have just seen, is positively related to the announcement effect). It is 
therefore difficult to separate the effect of size (a proxy for lender quality) and 
CDS usage in a univariate framework. 
  The same correlation with size is true for CLO issuance, although in this case, 
splitting the sample according to whether the lender has issued a CLO prior to the 
loan announcement does provide some evidence that loans from banks using 
portfolio credit risk transfer techniques are not rewarded so well by the stock 
market. CARs for loans from banks that have issued CLOs are positive but not 
statistically significant, while the average announcement effect of loans from 
banks that have not used this type of instrument are larger and statistically 
significant. The difference between the CDS and CLO results could be explained 
                                                 
8 We define borrowers to be small (large) if their real total assets at the announcement date are 
below (above) the median of the 175 companies in our sample with balance sheet data in 
Compustat.  
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by recognising that the CLO structure is relevant for the type of loans used in this 
study whereas CDS are not.
9 
  This difficulty of correlation between potential influences on CARs prompts 




5.2 Multivariate  analysis 
As noted in Section 4, the literature has identified several variables that may affect 
the equity market response to loan announcements. The impacts of these known 
factors for our sample are illustrated in the first three columns of Table 3. These 
report the regression of loan announcement CARs on loan, borrower, and lender 
characteristics (but exclude the lenders’ credit risk management policies). Loan 
characteristics are not significant in explaining the distribution of abnormal 
returns following loan announcements. Borrower characteristics, particularly the 
idiosyncratic risk of the company (SDPE) and to a lesser extent the equity 
performance immediately prior to the loan announcement (RUNUP), are 
significant. The signs of these variables are as expected. Finally, lender 
characteristics are not individually significant when included jointly. However, 
the high correlation between the size of the lender and its credit rating induces a 
classic collinearity problem (the correlation coefficient is 0.74). The F-test of joint 
significance of the lender characteristics is significant at the 1% level. In line with 
Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995), a regression of the CARs on log lender 
credit rating gives a coefficient of 0.137 (t-stat 3.12). A regression of CARs on 
log lender real assets gives a weakly significant coefficient of 0.005 (t-stat 1.80). 
Column (4) includes all the characteristics jointly. The coefficients change very 
little and the same key variables remain significant. 
 
                                                 
9 The effect of CDS usage in a univariate framework is a mix of the hypothesized negative impact 
from risk management activities, mitigated by the fact that CDSs are not actively traded for this 
group of borrowers, and positive impact from the correlation between CDS use and bank size. The 
effect of CLO issuance however is not mitigated since loans such as those analyzed are ideal for 
securitization, and hence the univariate effect is more negative.  
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Table 3.   The effect of lender credit risk management 
      policies on borrower returns 
 
Ordinary least squares regressions of two-day cumulative abnormal returns on loan, 
borrower, and lender characteristics including lender policies on credit risk management. 
AMT is the value of the loan ($m); REN is an indicator variable taking the value one of 
the loan is a renewal, zero otherwise; SYND is an indicator variable taking the value one 
of the loan is syndicated, zero otherwise; SDPE is the standard deviation of the residuals 
from the market model regression over the estimation window; BETA is the estimated 
coefficient from the market model regression over the estimation window; RUNUP is the 
cumulative abnormal return over the interval [-10, -1]; CR_LEND is the log of the 
numerical value of the lender’s Standard and Poor’s debt rating; ASSETS_LEND_REAL 
is the log of the total assets of the lender deflated with the GDP deflator. CDS_BUY is an 
indicator variable taking the value one if the lender reports positive outstanding notional 
credit derivatives protection purchased in the FRY9C return for the quarter immediately 
prior to the loan announcement, zero otherwise; CDS_NETBUY is an indicator variable 
taking the value one if the lender reports net positive outstanding notional credit 
derivatives protection purchase in the FRY9C return for the quarter immediately 
preceding the loan announcement, zero otherwise; CLO is an indicator variable taking the 
value one if the lender (or subsidiary) has issued a collateralized loan obligation prior to 
the loan announcement, zero otherwise. Numbers in parentheses are robust t-statistics. 
Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level is denoted by *, **, *** respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
CDS_BUY  
 
     0.022 
(1.23) 















































































































                
N  217  217 210  210  209  210 203 209 
⎯R2  0.001 0.130  0.021  0.143 0.143  0.169  0.147 0.165 
 
 
Columns (5) through (8) include lender credit risk transfer variables. In column 
(5) we include the credit default swap risk transfer dummy, CDS_BUY. It has a 
positive coefficient but is far from statistical significance. Similarly, the 
CDS_NETBUY indicator is also insignificant (column (6)). It appears that credit  
22 
risk management activities in the single-name credit default swap market have no 
material impact on the loan announcement effect. As before, we hypothesis that 
this is because the borrowers in our sample are typically not traded reference 
entities in the CDS market. 
  Column (7) includes the large scale loan securitisation dummy, CLO. It has a 
negative and economically large coefficient, with a p-value of 0.013. The 
coefficient suggests that a loan from a bank that is known to have issued a CLO 
results in a CAR that is 3.6% less than that gained from an equivalent deal with a 
bank that has not issued a CLO. Given the mean CAR in the sample is a little over 
1%, this effect is economically meaningful. Interestingly, the inclusion of the 
CLO term increases the magnitude and significance of the 
LENDER_ASSETS_REAL term. This suggests that the size of the lender does 
matter, but only when the credit risk transfer strategies of the lenders are taken 
into account. A loan from a large bank, other things equal, produces a larger CAR 
than a loan from a small bank. The 25
th percentile of the distribution of 
LENDER_ASSETS_REAL is 12.08, and the 75
th percentile is 13.44. The 
difference in the CAR between these two lenders is 2.98% [= (13.44-
12.08)*0.0219]. However, should the larger lender have issued a CLO, then the 
increased CAR due to lender size is more than offset by the -3.6% credit risk 
management effect.
10 
  The key results are robust to the following alternative specifications: 
 
1.  adding a set of dummy variables identifying the year in our sample, 
2.  removing various combinations of insignificant variables from the regression, 
3. replacing LENDER_ASSETS_REAL with dummy variables based on 
quartiles of the distribution of real lender size, 
4.  including the term BORROWER_ASSETS_REAL, defined in the same way 
as LENDER_ASSETS_REAL, for the reduced sample of companies for 
which this figure was available, 
5.  replacing CR_LENDER with either the unlogged numerical credit rating, or 
dummy variables for AA and BBB rated lenders. 
 
Specifically, the CLO term is significantly negative and economically meaningful 
irrespective of the particular specification of the regression equation. 
  CLO issuance is correlated with both the size and credit rating of the lender 
(correlation coefficients 0.67 and 0.30, respectively). To investigate whether these 
correlations are behind the significance of the CLO term we run a probit 
regression of CLO on LENDER_ASSEST_REAL and CR_LENDER.
11 We then 
                                                 
10 Recall that the very nature of the CLO structure implies that they are more likely to be issued by 
larger banks with more diversified loan portfolios. 
11 This regression works well with both explanatory variables highly significant, and 86.2% of 
observations are correctly classified.  
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replace CLO in Table III with the ‘residual’ of this model, CLO_RESID = CLO – 
predicted probability. This approach arbitrarily loads all the common explanatory 
power shared by CLO and the lender characteristics onto the latter. The estimated 
coefficient on CLO_RESID is -0.0264, with a p-value of 0.059. Although down 
from the original point estimate, it still suggests a significant negative impact of 
CLO issuance on the loan announcement effect. 
  While our panel contains 34 different bank lenders some appear relatively 
frequently.
12 It may be that the CLO effect we have identified is really driven by a 
fixed effect associated with a CLO-issuing bank that appears frequently in the 
data set. To examine this we took the five CLO-issuing banks that appear at least 
ten times in the sample. We sequentially excluded loans made by each of these 
banks and re-ran the regression. The coefficient on the CLO indicator is always 
below -0.028 and is always significant at the five percent level or higher. The 
CLO effect does not appear to be driven by fixed effects associated with 
frequently occurring banks. 
  The linear regression assumes that the issuance of a CLO by the lender has a 
fixed impact on the announcement effect, irrespective of other lender 
characteristics. We can address the impact of CLO issuance in a slightly different 
way, and ask ‘what proportion of the lender quality effect is removed by CLO 
issuance?’ To do this, we run the following non-linear regression: 
 
() [] i i 2 i 1 0 i i i LEND _ CR REAL _ ASSETS _ LENDER CLO 1 X CAR ε + α + α + α γ − + β =
 
where Xi is a vector of loan and borrower characteristics, and β is the associated 
vector of coefficients. The terms in square brackets together capture the lender 
quality effect on CARs, while the coefficient γ shows by what proportion this 
effect is reduced should the lender have issued a CLO. The coefficient is 
unrestricted in the estimation but is expected to lie between zero and one. 
  We estimate different versions of the equation using non-linear least squares. 
Varying the contents of X has little impact so we concentrate on a parsimonious 
specification with just SDPE and RUNUP and a constant term included in X. 
Table 4 shows that variations in the specification of the lender characteristics have 
little impact on the γ coefficient – it ranges from 0.59 to 0.77 and is significant at 
p-values of 0.085 or better. The regressions suggest that around two-thirds of the 
contribution of lender quality to the loan announcement effect is lost if the lender 
has issued a CLO. 
  Based on the estimates in column (1) of Table 4, the predicted lender quality 
effect for the average bank that has not issued a CLO by the time the loan is 
                                                 
12 Bank of America is the most frequently occurring bank, appearing 44 times. Of the other CLO 
issuing banks, JP Morgan Chase appears 26 times, Fleet 15 times, Wachovia 14 times and 
Citibank 10 times. Wells Fargo, a non-CLO issuer, appears 30 times.  
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announced (mean LENDER_ASSETS_REAL = 11.8, mean CR_LEND = 2.73) is 
3.61%. Banks that have issued CLOs are larger and higher rated (mean 
LENDER_ASSETS_REAL = 13.23, mean CR_LEND = 2.77) and their predicted 
effect would have been 7.40% had they not issued a CLO. However, issuing the 
CLO reduces the effect to 2.77%, less than the impact from the smaller, lower 
rated non-CLO lenders. 
 
Table 4.   Non linear modelling of impact of credit risk 
      management policies on borrower returns 
 
Nonlinear least squares regressions of two-day cumulative abnormal returns on borrower 
and lender characteristics, including lender policies on credit risk management. The 
equation estimated is of the form: 
 
() [] i i 2 i 1 0 i i i LEND _ CR REAL _ LEND _ ASSETS CLO 1 X CAR ε + α + α + α γ − + β =
 
where Xi is a vector containing a constant, SDPE and RUNUP and β is the associated 
vector of coefficient estimated. In addition RATING_AA and RATING_BBB are 
indicator variables taking the value one if the lender is rated AA or BBB respectively at 
the time of the loan announcement, zero otherwise. Numbers in parentheses are robust t-
statistics. Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level is denoted by *, **, *** 
respectively. 
 



























RATING_AA       -0.030 
(1.33) 
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When innovations mean that banks can now sell off credit risk arising from 
extending loans it is natural to question whether they will continue to monitor 
loans to the same extent. Several theoretical papers show that monitoring suffers 
in a world of increased credit risk transfer, while others argue bank monitoring 
may even be enhanced. Bankers and commentators also take contrasting stances. 
  In this paper we ask the equity market to adjudicate. There is ample evidence 
that the equity market rewards companies that raise loans from reputable lenders 
by increasing the share price of the borrower on the announcement of the loan. 
This is known as the bank certification effect. We examine whether the equity 
market also rewards borrowers that obtain loans from banks known to shift credit 
risk off their books. We use a sample of 217 loan announcements where the 
lender is a US bank. 
  The evidence suggests that the bank certification effect is significantly 
reduced if the lender has in the past sold off portfolio credit risk through issuing a 
collateralized loan obligation. We see this through three statistical tests. First, the 
average announcement effect where the lender has not previously issued a CLO is 
1.54%, but only 0.6% if the lender has issued a CLO. Second, in a multiple 
regression of the announcement effect on loan, borrower, and lender 
characteristics, the negative impact of past CLO issuance is over three per cent. 
This compares to a positive average certification effect of only a little over one 
percent. Finally, we note that CLO issuing banks are typically larger (and have 
higher credit ratings) than non-issuers. As such, they are seen as higher quality 
lenders and a loan from such a bank would, other things equal, be more highly 
rewarded by the stock market. For the average CLO-issuing bank, the lender 
quality contribution to the total certification effect would be 7.4% in the absence 
of CLO issuance. However, CLO issuance reduces this effect by around two-
thirds to 2.8%. This is lower than the 3.6% effect that would be expected from the 
smaller, lower rated banks that had not issued a CLO. 
  The results suggest that the equity market does not place much value on the 
information contained in the announcement of new loans extended by banks that 
have a track record of securitising credit risk. This indicates that the equity market 
does not believe that banks using this tool for credit risk management continue to 
monitor borrowers to the full extent. Combined with the evidence that banks that 
adopt credit risk management techniques also expand their loan portfolios, the two 
conditions for a Kindleberger-style mania identified by Partnoy and Skeel appear 
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